organizational dimensions enhance one form of organizational performance, environmental performance The Nadler & Tushman (1997) framework moves away from a simple dyadic notion of fit, such as between strategy and structure (Chandler, 1962) , to advance a richer framework based on four organizational dimensions: work, formal organization, informal organization, and the individual. Here, congruence can take on many forms, since there are six possible dyadic fits between the four dimensions. We are interested in connections between work and two types of organization: formal and informal. In our empirical setting we explore answers to these questions advanced by Nadler & Tushman (1997: 35) , all of which spotlight process:
• Work -Formal Organization Fit: Are organizational arrangements adequate to meet the demands of the work? In our context, we consider how the process of environmental management (work) can be improved by use of proper formal reporting relationships (formal organization).
• Work -Formal Organization Fit: Do organizational arrangements motivate behavior that is consistent with work demands? Here, we consider how the process of environmental management (work) can be improved by the use of an incentive-based formal salary structure (formal organization).
• Work -Informal Organization Fit: Does the informal organization structure facilitate work performance and does it meet the demands of the work? To address this question, we explore how the process of environmental management (work) can be improved by cross-functional coordination (informal organization).
By introducing the congruence framework to the study of environmental management processes and outcomes, we hope to at once be able to apply a potentially powerful theory to a new context and to peel away a few more layers of the conceptual onion.
CONGRUENCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE Fit Between Work and Formal Organization: Formal Reporting Relationships
Organizational design is central to congruence theory, which seeks to create synchronicity between work and the formal organization. The right formal organizational structure can smooth communications, energize high-powered incentives, and balance authority and autonomy. Ultimately, there is no "one best way to organize"-different structures are suitable for the performance of different kinds of activities, depending on operation conditions (Nadler & Tushman, 1997) . But a match between an organization's design and its work tasks can boost environmental performance.
Instead of focusing on broad classifications of organizational structures, as is often done in studies of fit (Chandler, 1962) , we feel that it is important to adopt a more fine-grained perspective. Blau (1974:12) defined structure as "the distributions, along various lines, of people among social positions that influence the role relations among these people." Within any organizational structure, formal reporting relationships are critical determinants of employee conduct. They determine how and where information flows within the organization and ultimately impact decision-making. Reporting relationships that are congruent with environmental management processes can boost environmental performance.
We believe that when a facility's environmental quality manager reports directly to the plant manager, environmental performance will improve.
2 A direct connection from the environmental quality manager to the plant manager supports cross-functional coordination, giving environmental issues greater weight as the corporate agenda is formed. With smoother communication, greater leveraging of ideas should follow. Also, by positioning the environmental quality manager close to the plant manager, a clear signal is sent to the organization about the importance of that function to the operation and success of the plant. This symbolism may also indicate a commitment to creating a context necessary for environmental issue championing behavior among other workers (Andersson & Bateman, 2000) .
This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H 1 Facilities in which the environmental quality manager reports directly to the plant manager will experience greater emissions reductions than those without such a reporting relationship.
Fit Between Work and Formal Organization: Incentive-based Formal Salary Structures A venerable adage is "what gets measured gets done." A corollary might well be "what gets rewarded gets done." The common sense of humans responding to incentives is not hard to grasp, and agency theory provides some insight into why the use of well-specified goals would be indispensable to environmental management. Monitoring alone may preempt managers from making decisions that conflict with the goals of their superiors (Tosi, Katz & Gomez-Mejia, 1997) , but the problem is that the monitoring of a facility's environmental quality manager is a challenge. He or she is typically responsible for a myriad of processes and policies, and on a given day may be engaged in creating or implementing policies, meeting with customers, testing mitigation equipment, or some other activity. With such a varied agenda, it would be difficult at best for superiors to monitor the individual's performance. Therefore, a compensation plan based on a fixed salary will create incongruence between the formal organization and the individual because the incentive system will not necessarily elicit the desired behavior.
For this reason, the use of additional incentive-based compensation is essential. This form of compensation, however, creates a subsidiary problem because it is not clear on what the incentive should be based. In an environmental management setting, a variety of goals could be established, as there are many possible measures of environmental performance (Ilinitch, Soderstrom, & Thomas, 1998; Lober, 1996) . For example, milestones for attaining an environmental certification like ISO 14001 or installing an environmental management system might be used, with compensation tied to meeting those milestones. While such an approach makes sense, it depends on episodic goals that might not create the type of annual, repeating criteria that can be used to measure improvement over time and to benchmark progress against other facilities. It is also subject to a lack of specificity that can lead to the "folly of rewarding A while expecting B" (Kerr, 1975) . For this reason, maximizing congruence requires the use of environmental criteria that are measurable, available across time, and available for other facilities. Emissions performance offers such a measure.
The logic that applies to the environmental quality manager largely applies to the plant manager. Lothe, Myrtveit, and Trapani (1999) argued that a compensation system that forces managers to focus on both profit-related and environment-related activities can promote sustainability. Anecdotal evidence that making managers accountable by linking merit systems to clear environmental goals is a "best practice" from an environmental leadership standpoint (Dechant & Altman, 1994 ) also exists.
Ultimately, we believe that when clear environmental criteria are used to adjust the compensation of environmental quality managers and plant managers, one can expect higher levels of congruence between the formal organization and the work performed, greater attention to environmental performance, and hence a cleaner facility. An incentive approach is especially useful with criteria that are relatively easier to monitor, since agency costs are lower (Gabel & Sinclair-Desgagné, 1993 The frequently overlooked source of congruence between work and informal organization is particularly important in the context of environmental management. This can be accentuated in R&D-intensive contexts, where a degree of structural differentiation makes coordination difficult (Donaldson, 1996:60) . The process of environmental management can isolate environmental quality managers and other professionals. Conflict can emerge when inadequate cross-functional communication reduces the effectiveness of pollution prevention initiatives, which often require cooperation among environmental quality managers, engineers, and production personnel (Cordano & Frieze, 2000) . Problems may also result when environmental quality managers fail to properly translate their agendas for business strategists. In both cases, the issues can be traced to a lack of congruence between the work of environmental management and the informal structure of the organization.
One way to remedy this incongruence is to use a cross-functional approach in strategic processes that have environmental ramifications (Maxwell, Rothenberg, Briscoe, & Marcus, 1997) . To the extent that individuals from each subunit provide important information, a decision process can be improved. King (1999) found that increased communication between production engineers and pollution control workers created an iterative problem-solving system. Sharma, Pablo, and Vredenburg (1999) proposed that lateral and upward information flows allowed managers to make informed decisions with respect to environmental issues. This dynamic has been documented at HADCO, a printed circuit board manufacturer that owns a facility in our sample, where such communication flows are encouraged (Ochsner, 2000) . Judge and Douglas (1998) have shown that coordination of strategy across relevant organizational functions, matched with the provision of sufficient resources, leads to the successful integration of environmental issues into the strategic planning process and advances financial and environmental performance. This finding echoes the sentiment that environmental issues are multi-faceted in their own right, and consistently require cross-functional coordination (Westley & Vredenburg, 1996) . Another benefit of involving environmental quality managers is symbolic-it can signal the importance of environmental issues to the plant or firm as a whole.
In the setting considered here, we wanted to ascertain whether or not the inclusion of environmental quality managers within discussions of important investment decisions led to improvements in environmental performance. A story relayed to the authors by an individual that served as an environmental professional provides a glimpse into the importance of such inclusion. Environmental quality personnel from a major semiconductor manufacturer were brought into discussions of a proposed plant addition. They pointed out early in the process that the favored design at that time would not only increase emissions, but push the plant across an important EPA threshold-making it a "major source" of pollution under that agency's statutes.
The upshot was that even minor changes subsequently made to the plant would need EPA approval, a potentially troublesome contingency. In the end, the plant addition was re-designed to keep the facility a "minor source" of pollution. Thus, cross-functional coordination provided an "early warning system," saving money, reducing risks, and enhancing flexibility.
We believe that cross-functional coordination gives environmental quality managers a voice in major strategic processes, with salutary effects. We therefore advance this hypothesis:
The greater the degree of inclusion of environmental quality managers in discussions concerning key strategic processes, the greater the emissions reductions at the facility.
ANALYSIS Sample
To test these hypotheses, we used a sample of electronics plants, broadly defined. The plant, or facility, is appropriate, because a) it is an important operating unit of companies, and b)
the Toxics Release Inventory is organized at this level. We collected data for facilities in six A university survey research center randomly selected facilities from the set of 1009 remaining facilities and secured cooperation from 316 of the 364 that it was able to contact. In each case, the contacted facility was asked to connect the caller to the environment quality manager. Since the survey was conducted in February and March of 2000, we treat survey data as placed at year-end 1999. Of the 316 facilities that were contacted, 147 were dropped from each analysis because the interviewee did not provide information on all variables that were used in analyses.
Variables
Dependent Variable. Our dependent variable was constructed using data from the Environmental Protection Agency database, the Toxics Release Inventory (or TRI). This database contains information on the release of 579 individually listed chemicals and 28 chemical categories on a facility-by-facility basis. Because the TRI provides information on substances that vary greatly in terms of toxicity, we used a method originated by King and Lenox (2000) to adjust them. Under this approach we divided emissions of each chemical by a quantity used by the EPA to set an upper limit on what could be discharged without having to report an incidence of a spill to the EPA. These "reportable quantities" vary with the toxicity of a given substance; the more toxic the substance, the lower the reportable quantity. We then aggregated across the chemicals released at a facility to produce what we termed a "Toxics Release Index."
Because this data was skewed, a logarithmic transformation (after adding 1) was then performed.
Formally, the Toxics Release Index can be expressed in this way:
where E i = Emissions of chemical i to air, land, and water, if emissions are above the reporting threshold, and 0 otherwise, RQ i = the EPA reportable quantity for chemical i, and i = an index denoting each of the 529 chemicals that are tracked by the TRI.
Where releases of none of the 529 chemicals exceed threshold levels, this index results in a missing value, because no report to the TRI is necessary. On the other hand, if emissions of at least one chemical exceed the threshold, the Toxics Release Index has a value.
Use of the Toxics Release Inventory is now well established in research on environmental impacts of corporations (e.g., Klassen & Whybark, 1999; King & Lenox, 2000) .
Nonetheless, it has a number of limitations. The first is that the system relies on self-reporting of emissions, often using estimates of releases rather than exact measurements. This approach can introduce errors into the system. Second, the reporting procedures may have elicited malfeasance on occasion, manifested in willful underreporting of emissions. In response, the EPA has used a system of fines and other enforcement actions to police the reporting function.
A third limitation-more a function of the substances covered in TRI than TRI itself-is the differing impacts on the ecosystem of the various toxic substances accounted for by TRI. We tried to address this in our operationalization of a Toxics Release Index in our analyses. A final issue is that the TRI data reflect releases of chemicals but not the level of exposure of the public i or the ecosystem (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2002 if the environmental quality manager or the plant manager, respectively, had a portion of salary tied to environmental performance, and 0 otherwise.
To test Hypothesis 3, we created a composite variable by adding responses from three survey questions, on which interviewees were asked to use a 5-point scale (1 indicating strong disagreement, 5 indicating strong agreement) to respond to these statements concerning inclusiveness in strategic processes (Cronbach's alpha = 0.88):
• Environmental quality managers are included in discussions about the choices of equipment to be installed at the facility.
• Environmental quality managers are included in discussions about fundamental design issues impacting the facility.
• Environmental quality managers are included in discussions about potential process modifications.
Control Variables. We included other variables to control for important influences on facility emissions. The most critical of these is size, which we controlled by including the number of employees at each facility, using information taken from interviewees. Since younger plants might be designed more efficiently and cleanly, we included the age of the plant, to try to pick up any influence of its vintage. We used a logarithmic transformation of age in our regressions. To try to control for varying environmental regulation in the state, we used a measure of total toxic releases per dollar of state GDP (Meyer, 1995) . We used a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the facility had an environmental management system (EMS) in place, and 0 otherwise, and another with analogous coding for ISO 14001 certification. A facility needed to have an EMS or ISO certification for more than half of the year for that variable to be coded 1.
ISO certification requires an EMS, but the reverse is not true. Because many of the facilities in our sample had an EMS but not ISO 14001 certification, the correlation between those two variables was relatively low. We expect either system to lead to reduced emissions.
Finally, to pick up the manufacturing strategies of the facilities, we added two variables:
product innovation and process innovation. Product innovation was measured on a 5-point scale
(1 indicating strong disagreement, 5 indicating strong agreement) by responses to a question first posed by Christmann (2000) : "Relative to our major competitors that manufacture in the U.S.,
we have been a leader in the introduction of product innovations over the last three years."
Process innovation was measured in an analogous way.
Statistical Methods
Our goal was to estimate the Toxics Release Index for the year 2000. Using simple linear regression would not be appropriate due to the lack of emissions data for numerous facilities.
These omissions are not random occurrences-facilities that manufacture or process less than 25,000 pounds and do not use at least 10,000 pounds of any of EPA's listed chemicals are not required to report to TRI (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2002). In our data base, there were 113 such observations, so our estimation procedure needed to account for them.
One approach would be to use a sample selection bias model (Heckman, 1979) . This approach has the disadvantage of reducing sample size, and thus restricting statistical power.
Therefore, we used a Tobit analysis, a maximum likelihood technique that accommodates censored data (Johnson & DiNardo, 1997) . The general Tobit model applies when the dependent variable is continuous in nature, but bounded; the censored Tobit applies when the dependent variable is only reported above or below some level. This model has the advantage of utilizing data from the non-reporting facilities. To conduct this analysis, however, we had to account for the fact that in many cases, an independent variable was missing-the lagged dependent variable. We modeled lagged effects in the following way. First, we included a dummy variable coded 1 if the facility reported data in the last reporting period, and 0 otherwise. In theory, the coefficient on this variable should model the TRI reporting threshold. A second variable tracked reported emissions; it was set equal to those lagged emissions if reported, and 0 otherwise.
Together, these variables model a process where reported emissions are 0 below a threshold level, and then increase with the level of actual lagged emissions.
Our analyses are cross-sectional, but with lagged dependent variables. As noted above, data for key independent variables (e.g., inclusiveness of strategic processes) was placed at yearend 1999. For control variables (e. g., employees and plant age), we had information for a number of years, so we used 1999 data also. For the dependent variable, toxic releases, we also had data for several years, but used 2000 emissions to account for prior causality.
Initial Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables are shown in Table 1 .
_________________________________________________________________
Insert Table 1 about here _________________________________________________________________ Table 2 provides the results of our regressions. The strong impact of the lagged dependent variable and filing status variable suggests the propriety of the modeling approach.
Model A contains the control variables, and Model B adds independent variables to the equation.
When viewed together, the addition of these four variables does not significantly improve model fit. Of our independent variables, only the coefficient associated with whether or not the plant manager has his or her compensation tied to environmental performance achieves a marginal level of significance. None of the variables tracking inclusiveness, reporting relations, or a tie between the environmental quality manager's pay and environmental performance are associated with emissions performance.
Turning to the control variables, as one might expect, the presence of an environmental management system is associated with lower emissions. Surprisingly, however, ISO 14001 registration is associated with greater emissions. This might be because a large number of facilities registered just prior to 2000, and might not have had the chance to fully implement the ISO system. It might also be the case that ISO 14001 registration, which does not mandate emissions reductions, was seen as a way to "provide cover" for poor emissions performance by appearing to take steps in the right direction. Finally neither product nor process innovation leaders appear to be leaders in emissions reductions. This is somewhat surprising in the case of process leaders, since waste reduction is generally seen as a process imperative (Florida, 1996) .
_________________________________________________________________ Insert Table 2 about here _________________________________________________________________ An Extension
Why would several seemingly straightforward relationships not hold in our data? It is not due to the specification of the dependent variable, because using an alternative measure, emissions divided by plant size, returned similar results. The first reason for this lack of significance might be that in the eyes of facility managers, environmental performance is measured not by TRI emissions, but some other means. Despite the problems stemming from a lack of clear measurement and comparability to other plants, it may be that the avoidance of spills and other high-profile events is a better outcome than steadily lowering emissions. A second possibility is that data for the year 2000, used for our dependent variable, might have been skewed by the onset of a serious recession in this industry. It is possible that environmental performance was subordinated when market disruptions struck the firms studied here in mid to late 2000.
The third possibility, which we can directly test, is that our independent variables are actually the result of variables in our model, not their cause. Put a different way, is internal change the result of past emissions performance? This might be the case if, for example, establishing a more direct reporting relationship was a reaction to consistently high emissions.
Having the environmental quality manager report directly to the facility manager might be seen as a method for addressing incongruence by tightening up communication and signifying a greater commitment to the environment in the future.
Because we have data on a number of critical variables across time, we attempted to explore this last issue with additional cross-sectional analyses. To do so, we had to address several statistical issues. First, because the dependent variable is dichotomous in several cases, we used logistic regression (as with Tobit, a maximum likelihood approach) to estimate whether reporting relationships and pay were tied to environmental performance. We used ordinary linear regression to estimate our inclusiveness variable, which runs from 3 to 15. 4 We included toxic releases as an independent variable, and the same control variables as in our previous analyses. To conduct these regressions, we had to revisit the fact that we had no emissions data for many facilities. Because this variable was now an independent variable, we decided to use the lowest reported emission level for non-reporting facilities, following Klassen and Whybark (1999) . Some confidence in this approach emerges from regressions in which only data for facilities with toxic release data was available. Patterns of coefficients are similar to what we found, although in several cases significance suffers. We decided to use independent variables (that is, controls plus toxic release data) from the year 1998, to allow them to precede survey data that we placed at year-end 1999 now used for dependent variables. Using 1998 rather than 1999 data for several variables reduced our number of observations because there were eight more instances of missing data for control variables in 1998 than in 1999. Analyses using 1997 or 1999 data for independent variables and controls were very similar.
A separate issue arises from our data. When we use our internal variables as dependent variables, it must be noted that we only have information on these variables at the beginning of 2000. We do not know their status for any earlier years, information that could help us improve causality by capturing changes in policy at a given facility. In that way, we could tie a change (for example, a determination to begin tying managerial salary to environmental performance) to prior environmental performance. Readers should take this into account when reviewing our results. The results of our additional analyses are shown in Table 3 .
_________________________________________________________________
Insert Table 3 about here _________________________________________________________________ In all four cases, the coefficient on the internal variables is statistically significant, but since Model (C)'s overall fit is not significant, that result cannot be considered meaningful. So, in three of four cases, reverse causality is indicated by the analyses. Several relationships are worth noting. For instance, the older the facility, the more likely is managerial pay to be tied to environmental performance. This might reflect the higher risks of older technology, and the greater imperative to avoid spills. Similarly, the larger the facility, the more likely are both the facility manager's salary and the environmental quality manager's salary to reflect environmental performance. Here, a larger plant might be more complex, and demand a broader set of performance guidelines. Finally, facilities with environmental management systems are associated with greater levels of inclusiveness. Implementation of most systems demands such holistic planning and execution, so this relationship could be expected.
DISCUSSION
Starting at the Top Our results provide weak support for the idea that incentive systems can elicit desired environmental outcomes. The effect is not uniform, however: environmental performance is enhanced when there is a tie between environmental performance and pay-but only for facility managers, not environmental quality managers. It is possible that environmental quality managers would see such a tie as being redundant, especially if they feel that they are doing all in their power to minimize emissions already. For plant managers, however, such a tie could represent a new 'carrot' and shift some managerial attention to environmental issues. It may also be the case that the agency problem is more substantial for environmental quality than for other facility performance measures. For example, it may be relatively straightforward to assess the manager's performance with respect to output figures, defect rates, and other production measures. But incentives could be a valuable tool for improving environmental performance, which is more difficult to observe and judge. Here, their effect could be powerful.
Interpreting Reverse Causality
One overarching conclusion that might be drawn from our analysis is that facilities in our sample continue to act reactively. If in fact policies follow from emissions and not the other way around, exhortations to "prevent pollution in the first place" (Cairncross, 1991) , "stay ahead of regulations" (Dechant & Altman, 1994) , and otherwise be more proactive have yet to hit home. Does it matter if appropriate policies are instituted only after a facility recognizes its environmental failings? It might. To appreciate this, we can contrast two facilities, one in which the environmental quality manager's pay has always been tied to environmental performance and another in which this is the result of poor prior environmental performance. If more focused incentives are put in place after relatively poorer performance, the organizational antecedents to improved performance, like employee buy-in, might not exist. A shift in the pay scale might provoke jealousy if it is seen as "rewarding failure." If instead the prior situation were deemed the responsibility of the environmental quality manager, who is then replaced, the new individual would face sizeable start-up costs as he or she tries to institute change.
Takeaways for Congruence Theory
How can we evaluate congruence theory in view of these results? A number of ideas emerge. First, design can be the result of performance, not the other way around. Several writers have used congruence models to assert that there is a progression of fit for any organization as it grows across time. For example, Milliman, Von Glinow, and Nathan (1991) argued that the type of fit changes across the organizational life cycle as a firm expands internationally. In their model, however, changes in HRM policy reflect the organizational life cycle, not necessarily any performance indicators. Our results suggest that performance gaps may play a more central role in triggering redesign.
Thinking along related lines, the conditions under which change takes place may also have an impact on process. In our case, relatively poorer environmental performance might be viewed in differing ways by organizations. Perhaps urgency for change was seen in some, while for others the primacy of financial considerations dominated. Another idea comes from Siggelkow (2001) , who argued for a distinction between fit-conserving and fit-destroying changes. His idea was that fit-destroying changes actually are easier to deal with because they strike at the root of current organizational design flaws. By contrast, fit-conserving changes do not elicit an urgency to act, and may lead to congruence being a "managerial trap" (Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996) . If crisis leads to fit-destroying change that loosens organizational rigidities, it would be very valuable to follow our sampled organizations for a longer period of time to see how they responded to the severe economic disruptions of the recent technology slump. If this experience forces managers to instigate fit-destroying change, it could be an opportunity for environmental quality managers to shape the organization's re-design to promote the integration of environmental stewardship and production activities.
Several ideas for further research on congruence emerge from this work. One idea follows from the last point and begins by viewing organizational performance as a multidimensional construct. While financial performance is generally recognized as the critical indicator for organizations, it depends on performance in subordinate, contributing areas like manufacturing efficiency, process innovation, and environmental management. Although several authors have established the link between environmental performance and firm-wide performance (Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996; Russo & Fouts, 1997; Dowell, Hart, & Yeung, 2000) , perhaps the organizational designs that drive the two types of performance are not exactly the same. For example, it may be that a tight, functional structure produces low-cost reliable electronics parts, but a matrix element for the environmental function, which can create inclusion and awareness of this imperative across the organization, might best lead to environmental improvement. How should these seemingly conflicting design elements be resolved?
One possible clue comes from research on the ambidextrous organization (Bradach, 1997; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996) that builds in tight and loose coupling simultaneously. While the focus in this research has been on sub-units, it does provide a platform for beginning to understand how seeming inconsistencies can co-exist with organizations and actually promote success. It may be that one key to successful environmental management involves a congruence that we did not explore in this paper-fit between informal organization and the individual.
Perhaps a culture with tight-loose elements necessitates recruiting individuals that can deal with its ambidextrous quality. It may also be true that exploring the incentive system on a deeper level than available data permitted here could reveal new subtleties. Determining how a range of environmental performance indicators impacted behavior would be valuable, but the form of the compensation increment could be important also. Gain-sharing, bonuses, and other performance-based compensation plans might have differing congruence properties. 5 We have shown that congruence theory has much to offer to the study of environmental management. But we looked at only a small part of the model, connections between work and formal & informal organization. Surely, there is a rich set of variables at the individual level that can be used to explore fit between individuals and other variables in the congruence model.
Consider the individual-organization fit that is illustrated by the "convergence of individual and organizational goals" (Nadler & Tushman, 1997:35) . Firms that performed higher on social criteria were judged more attractive by prospective employees (Turban & Greening, 1997) . If the same was true of environmental criteria, it would show a tangible benefit of congruenceand broaden the applicability of congruence theory to environmental performance.
A Concluding Thought
Trying to specify the causal system at work in a single large organization is a tall order.
To then attempt to find common patterns of causality in a population of like organizationssome more similar than others-can frustrate any scholar. Rather than search for some explanatory "Holy Grail," researchers might best view every analysis as a puzzle piece. Each has limited value on its own, but becomes increasingly helpful as additional puzzle pieces are put in place. Our goal in this exploratory study was to provide another piece of a jigsaw puzzle that will tantalize, surprise, and hopefully, inspire scholars as the complete picture comes into view. ENDNOTES 1.
These choices are both bolstered if we consider the hierarchy of 24 environmental evaluation criteria suggested by Lober (1996) that move increasingly from a firm-specific focus to an external focus. For example, the first two of Lober's categories spotlight corporate policies and codes of environmental ethics, while the last several address relationships with stakeholders and communication. Between these two poles are groups of variables that represent internal processes and, then, firm-specific environmental outcomes.
All three of our variables of interest fall into two consecutive categories in Lober's tightly defined continuum under "Corporate Structure" and "Employee Involvement."
2.
In this manuscript, we use the term "environmental quality manager" to represent the senior individual responsible for environmental tasks at a facility. There is no generally accepted job title for this individual, but this term is sufficiently flexible that it creates a shared meaning among practitioners and academics. When facilities were contacted, use of the term created no confusion.
3. Nonetheless, absent real-time monitoring of actual releases, researchers should continue to exercise some degree of caution when using and interpreting TRI data. A reviewer points out that it is possible that it is possible that facilities that perform relatively poorly with respect to emissions might be devoting their energies to changing their business models more fundamentally, so as to leapfrog to more sustainable operations.
4. Although model fit is modest, no predicted values were outside of this range, indicating that linear regression performed adequately 5. The authors thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point. 
